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Abstract—Byzantine fault tolerant protocols enable state repli-
cation in the presence of crashed, malfunctioning, or actively ma-
licious processes. Designing such protocols without the assistance
of verification tools, however, is remarkably error-prone. In an
adversarial environment, performance and flexibility come at the
cost of complexity, making the verification of existing protocols
extremely difficult. We take a different approach and propose a
formally verified consensus protocol designed for a specific use
case: secure logging. Our protocol allows each node to propose
entries in a parallel subroutine, and guarantees that correct nodes
agree on the set of all proposed entries, without leader election.
It is simple yet practical, as it can accommodate the workload
of a logging system such as Certificate Transparency. We show
that it is optimal in terms of both required rounds and tolerable
faults. Using Isabelle/HOL, we provide a fully machine-checked
security proof based upon the Heard-Of model, which we extend
to support signatures. We also present and evaluate a prototype
implementation.
Index Terms—Byzantine fault tolerance, consensus algorithm,
formal verification
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of Byzantine consensus has been the subject
of a considerable amount of research over the past decades,
giving rise to various Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols,
most notably Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
by Castro and Liskov [1]. In response to the publication of
PBFT, there have been many attempts to improve on the
performance and robustness of the protocol by focusing on
different scenarios. For instance, Zyzzyva [2] is designed to
be especially efficient in the absence of failures, whereas
Aardvark [3], on the contrary, is designed to react gracefully
when failures occur.
These protocols were designed for high-throughput, low-
latency state-machine replication. Unfortunately, this is only
possible at the cost of complexity [4]. The BFT-SMART [5]
library, which implements a variant of PBFT, can serve as
a benchmark with almost 25,000 lines of Java code. Even
in a benign fault model, where nodes can only crash and
messages may be lost but not modified, distributed systems are
notoriously hard to design and implement. In the presence of
possibly malicious participants, arguing about the correctness
and security of such protocols is an even greater challenge, or
in the words of Lamport et al. [6]: “We know of no area in
computer science or mathematics in which informal reasoning
is more likely to lead to errors than in the study of this type of
algorithm.” To guarantee the security of such complex systems,
a formal treatment is thus essential. The traditional approach
in the distributed systems community is to provide a pen-and-
paper proof for the desired properties of the protocol. At best,
such proofs provide some intuition about why the claimed
properties hold, but since they lack the rigor that is required
to argue about such systems, they cannot be reasonably used as
a guarantee. Past experiences, such as the Chord protocol [7],
which had all of its hand-proved properties refuted by model
checking, have shown that proofs must be machine-checked.
Such proofs tend to be much longer and more detailed than
their hand-crafted counterparts, but manual error can be ruled
out conclusively using proof assistants.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no complete
machine-checked proof for any authenticated BFT protocol.
Most work on verifying distributed systems has instead fo-
cused on consensus algorithms like Raft [8] and Paxos [9],
which only tolerate benign faults. The IronFleet project [10]
can serve as a benchmark for the complexity of large-scale
verification efforts, as it expended approximately 3.7 person-
years for the proof of a Paxos-based distributed system and
its implementation. Due to the tremendous complexity of a
Byzantine fault model caused by the introduction of arbitrary
behavior, it is reasonable to assume that the effort of verifying
a complex BFT protocol would require even more resources.
The lack of formal verification makes general-purpose BFT
protocols unsuitable for security-critical applications, even
if they have been tested and deployed in practice. To the
best of our knowledge, the only instance of complete formal
verification of a BFT protocol is by Debrat and Merz [11], who
verified two algorithms proposed by Biely et al. [12] using
the Isabelle/HOL [13] proof assistant. However, the properties
provided by these very simple algorithms are too weak for use
in many realistic settings.
Instead of aiming to develop a general-purpose BFT sys-
tem, we focus on the use case of secure logging, a critical
component in a variety of systems: modern public-key infras-
tructures [14, 15], online voting systems [16, 17], secure times-
tamping services [18, 19], and more [20]. In this endeavor, we
make the following contributions:
• We present Logres, a BFT protocol designed specifically
for secure log replication, and provide machine-checked
proofs of all its properties using the Isabelle/HOL proof
assistant. Our protocol model and proofs consist of ap-
proximately 300 and 1000 lines of code, respectively, and
are available online [21]. Although the protocol is simple,
our verification revealed subtle flaws in its initial design,
which have since been fixed.
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• We extend the Heard-Of model [22] to capture the
concept of digital signatures. Our extended model can
be used to verify other BFT algorithms that make use of
signatures.
• We evaluate the performance of a prototype implemen-
tation to demonstrate that our protocol can be used in
practical scenarios.
II. BACKGROUND: SECURE LOGGING
Logging can trivially be performed by a single server,
but this server must then be trusted to (a) accept all valid
requests, (b) not remove existing entries from the log, and (c)
show the same view of the log to all clients. Verifiable data
structures based on cryptographic primitives (such as Merkle
hash trees) [23, 24] enable the efficient auditing of logs. This
is, most notably, the approach employed in the Certificate
Transparency (CT) framework [14]. Verifiable logging by
itself is not sufficient though, as a malicious log server can
still choose to ignore requests and show different views to
different clients [25]. A log server ignoring specific requests
is particularly problematic, because such misbehavior is hard
to demonstrate and reporting it to a third party has privacy
implications [26].
Relying on a single server has obvious drawbacks: weakest-
link security, no resilience to failure, and no censorship
resilience. On the other hand, relying on a large collection
of non-synchronized log servers makes monitoring difficult.
Indeed, a client cannot simply query one CT log server to
inspect all entries related to a given domain name, for example,
but must instead rely on monitors that keep entire copies of
several logs. In turn, monitors must be trusted to correctly
display all relevant entries from all trusted logs, which has
revealed to be a challenge in practice [27]. For these reasons,
we propose a protocol that allows independent entities to
maintain a single log, thus providing resilience to compromise,
failure, and censorship, while facilitating the monitoring of the
log’s contents by resource-limited clients.
A large majority of CT log servers accepted by Google
Chrome have a “maximum merge delay” of 24 hours at the
time of writing. This means that log servers will typically
append newly submitted certificates to their hash tree within
24 hours. In such a context, our protocol would operate on
a timescale that is perhaps unconventional for a distributed
system, with each round of the protocol lasting several hours.
However, we evaluate Logres within much smaller timeframes
as well in Section VI, and find it to be able to support
substantial workloads even with a 1-minute period.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Log Replication with Byzantine Fault Tolerance
BFT protocols are commonly designed to achieve state-
machine replication, where processes agree on an ordered set
of incoming requests from clients, creating an input log that is
equal on all processes. Running a deterministic state machine
on the log then produces the same results on each node. The
design goals in this problem space are usually low latency
and high throughput, enabling the protocol to handle a high
volume of requests quickly.
This paper considers the related but slightly different prob-
lem of BFT log replication. In this problem, a set of n nodes,
of which at most f may fail, periodically run a distributed
algorithm to maintain a log. There is an arbitrary number of
clients in the system that can send messages to the nodes,
requesting entries to be added to the log. Moreover, the
clients can obtain the most recently created log along with
an authenticator and verify the validity of its entries locally.
In order to achieve log replication, a protocol must satisfy the
following properties:
Agreement All valid logs created during a run of the protocol
must be equal.
Completeness If an entry is submitted by a client to a correct
node, the node will include it in its next log produced.
Liveness A run of the protocol must always produce a new
valid log for every correct node.
This problem is different from BFT state-machine replica-
tion in three ways:
• There exists an inherent total order on entries (e.g.,
alphabetical or chronological). Therefore, no coordination
is required to determine an ordering, unlike in the state-
machine replication problem.
• Clients are not limited to obtaining the output of a state
machine. Instead, they can verify the integrity of the
entire log, or parts of it.
• The system aggregates entries and produces new outputs
in fixed intervals, not in response to each request.
Due to these differences, the log replication problem allows
for less complex solutions, as client requests do not need to
be processed individually with low latency. Nevertheless, this
problem appears in various real-world systems, such as public-
key infrastructures.
B. Assumptions
We use the standard Byzantine fault model, where up to f
of the n nodes may crash, malfunction, or even be actively
malicious (and colluding). We call these nodes faulty, and
there are at least n− f remaining nodes that we call correct.
The protocol relies on the following assumptions, which are
common for BFT protocols:
(A1) There is a correct majority of nodes, i.e., the constraint
n > 2f must hold.
(A2) Messages sent between correct nodes are neither lost nor
modified, i.e., communication is synchronous.
(A3) Every node has a key pair and knows the public keys of
all other nodes.
We stress that assumption (A2) is attainable in practice
using loose time synchronization combined with a transport
protocol that provides reliable and authenticated communica-
tion. Moreover, if a link between two nodes fails, the nodes can
simply be considered faulty, and if the parameter f is chosen
large enough, the protocol will be able to continue operating
without any issues.
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IV. THE LOGRES PROTOCOL
A. Definitions and Notation
A log contains an ordered sequence of entries as well as an
expiration timestamp. The makeLog(L,X) function creates a
new log from the previous log L and a set of new entries
X . A log is valid if and only if it has not expired and is
signed by f + 1 different nodes. These signatures serve to
verify the authenticity of a log and can be computed over a
digest of it (using the getDigest(L) function, which may be a
simple hash function, or may return the root of a hash tree,
for example). Since there are at most f faulty nodes in the
system, the requirement of f + 1 signatures ensures that they
cannot collude to forge a log without obtaining a signature
from a correct node.
We use σi(x) to denote a signature for x created by process
i using its private key. 〈x | i〉 is shorthand for a signed term,
i.e., 〈x | i〉 := (x, σi(x)). Analogously, we use 〈x |W 〉 for a
term x that is signed by a set of nodes W , which are called
witnesses.
B. Protocol Overview
The protocol is organized into rounds of communication,
which can be implemented in asynchronous settings assuming
loose time synchronization.
A key insight into how the protocol can be kept simple
while still achieving strong security properties is that it does
not require leader election. This concept allows low-latency
BFT protocols to process requests quickly by designating
one process as a leader, also called primary. While this can
reduce the number of messages required, electing a leader also
introduces a high amount of complexity, as the system needs
to be able to handle cases where the current primary crashes or
is actively malicious. For this purpose, processes can initiate a
“view change” phase to convince others to hold a new election.
At the core of Logres lies the CONSENSUS subroutine, a
distributed consensus algorithm. While this subroutine is also
based on a primary, we avoid the process of leader election
by running n instances in parallel, such that each node is the
leader of exactly one thread. The goal of this technique is to
achieve interactive consistency, which Pease et al. [28] define
as follows. Each node i chooses an initial value vi, and the
following properties must hold:
(IC1) All correct nodes agree on the same vector V of n
values.
(IC2) For a correct node i, all correct nodes agree on i’s initial
value: Vi = vi.
Our protocol operation is specified in detail in Algorithm 1
and illustrated in Figure 1. It consists of three phases:
1) Collection (1 round)
Clients can send requests for entries to be added to the
log, where each request should be sent to f + 1 distinct
nodes to guarantee that at least one correct node receives
it. Each node stores all entries that it has received and
that have not been added locally. During this phase, no
communication takes place between the nodes.
Collection 1 2 3 . . .. . . . . .
Consensus
(f + 1 rounds)
Signing
Li−2
Li−1
Li
Fig. 1. An overview of the protocol operation. Each white rectangle
represents a round of communication. Logs are characterized by their va-
lidity period. The exact definition of a validity period is left to application
developers. Round lengths can also be tuned to each application.
Algorithm 1 Main protocol
1: procedure LOGRES
Code for node i
Collection phase:
2: X ← collect entries from clients
Consensus phase:
3: {X1, . . . , Xn} ← {CONSENSUS(p,X) : 1 ≤ p ≤ n}
4: X ← X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xn
Signing phase:
5: L← log from previous epoch
6: L′ ← makeLog(L,X)
7: h← getDigest(L′)
8: broadcast σi(h)
9: Σ← receive θ − 1 valid signatures for h
10: publish (L′,Σ ∪ {σi(h)})
2) Consensus (f + 1 rounds)
With the set X of all cached entries from the previous
phase as input, the CONSENSUS subroutine is run in
parallel n times. In each of these executions, a different
node acts as the primary. The CONSENSUS subroutine
is explained in more detail in Section IV-C, but for the
sake of this overview, we can assume that it achieves
interactive consistency for initial values X and the result
vector is (X1, . . . , Xn). This implies that after line 4,
all correct nodes obtain the same value for X , and their
collected entries from the previous phase are contained
in X .
3) Signing (1 round)
Using the log from the previous run and the union of all
new entries, each node constructs a new log.
After the new log L′ is constructed, each node broadcasts
a signature for getDigest(L′) to all other nodes.1 Each
node then collects signatures from f other participants
that have also constructed the same log and publishes it
along with all signatures.
In the following subsection, we describe in detail the
CONSENSUS subroutine, which is the main building block of
the protocol, and explain how the consensus phase achieves
interactive consistency.
1 The log needs not be sent along with the signature, as the other correct
nodes will have constructed the same log L′.
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Algorithm 2 Consensus phase
1: procedure CONSENSUS(p,X)
Code for node i:
2: if i = p then ⊲ node is primary
3: broadcast 〈X, p | i〉
4: return X
5: else ⊲ node is responder
6: P ← ∅ ⊲ witnessed values
7: d← ∅ ⊲ decision value
8: for rounds r = 1, . . . , f + 1 do
9: M ← receive messages
10: M ′ ← {〈x, p |W 〉 ∈M. p ∈W ∧ |W | ≥ r}
11: P ′ ← {x. ∃W. 〈x, p |W 〉 ∈M ′}
12: if P ′ \ P 6= ∅ then
13: if |P ∪ P ′| = 1 then
14: d← the only element of P ′
15: else
16: d← ∅
17: S ← ∅
18: for x ∈ P ′ \ P do
19: 〈x, p |W 〉 ← any element of M ′
20: S ← S ∪ {〈x, p |W ∪ {i}〉}
21: multicast S to other responders
22: P ← P ′
23: return d
C. Consensus Phase
For the sake of abstraction, we will refer to a set of entries as
a value and note that CONSENSUS is not limited to a specific
type of value, but can be used more generally. The algorithm
must satisfy the following two properties:
(C1) All correct nodes return the same value.
(C2) If the primary p is correct, all correct nodes return the
primary’s input value X .
If these properties hold for all parallel executions of CON-
SENSUS, it follows that the consensus phase satisfies (IC1)
and (IC2). The main challenge in designing the algorithm does
not lie in securing executions in which the primary is correct,
but in preventing a faulty primary from causing disagreement
between correct nodes. This is especially difficult because the
primary may be actively malicious and colluding with all other
faulty nodes.
Informally, the algorithm works as follows. Only the pri-
mary can propose new values, which it does by signing them.
When a process receives such a value, it forwards the value
to other nodes and testifies to witnessing it by appending its
own signature. This is necessary for two reasons: (a) to inform
nodes about the primary’s value in case the message in the
initial round was lost, and (b) to detect equivocation by the
primary (i.e., sending different values in an attempt to create
different views).
However, this technique alone is not enough to prevent
attacks: A malicious primary could collude with responders
and attempt to introduce a new value to some nodes in the
last round, so the receivers will not have time to share it. To
prevent this, correct nodes also apply the following policy: In
round r, received values that have fewer than r witnesses are
discarded. Any values sent in the last round must therefore be
signed by f + 1 nodes in order to be accepted, i.e., at least
one correct node must have witnessed it previously.
After introducing the main concepts used in CONSENSUS,
we now explain the subroutine in more detail and refer to the
specification in Algorithm 2. In most situations, the execution
of CONSENSUS is simple and requires only two rounds of
communication. Such a normal case is depicted in Figure 2.
1) Primary: The procedure for the primary p is simple: p
broadcasts its initial value in the first round and returns. A term
of the form 〈x, p | i〉 represents the assertion “node i testifies
to having witnessed value x from primary p”. It is important
to include p in the signature, as this prevents replay attacks
using signatures received in different threads.
2) Responders: The other nodes, which we call responders,
keep in their state the set P containing all values witnessed
from the primary, as well as their current decision value d.
In the following, we describe the behavior of a responder
node with identifier i. During each round r, node i listens
for any messages of the form 〈x, p |W 〉 and stores them in
the set M (discarding any invalid signatures). After a timeout,
i advances to line 10 and selects from M all messages that
are (a) signed by the primary, and (b) witnessed by a total
of r nodes (including the primary). From these messages M ′,
all distinct values are extracted and stored in P ′, which now
contains all values that have been accepted this round.
If i has accepted any new values this round (i.e., P ′ \ P 6=
∅), it adjusts its decision based on the values it has accepted
so far (line 13). If |P ∪ P ′| = 1 holds, i stores the new value
in P ′ as its current decision. If there are more values in the
two sets, i has proof of misbehavior by p because a correct
primary will never send more than one value. In this case, i
decides on the default value, which is the empty set.
In both of these two cases, i needs to testify to having
witnessed the new values in P ′ \ P . For this purpose, a
message m is assembled containing all new values with the
corresponding signatures (lines 17–20). For each new value
x, i adds a signature of its own to the message. m is then
broadcast to all other responders.
Finally, after all f + 1 rounds have completed, i concludes
the consensus phase by returning its current decision d.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Informal Security Analysis
The goal of the following informal arguments is to pro-
vide intuition as to why our protocol satisfies the claimed
properties. A more rigorous treatment using formal proofs is
presented in Section VII.
The security arguments are structured such that the proper-
ties of CONSENSUS are discussed first. By building on these,
we argue that LOGRES achieves agreement, completeness, and
liveness. This is also the structure that our formal proof fol-
lows, as it allows for a more modular argument by treating the
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p {x}
1 {x}
2 {x}
3 {x}
4 {x}
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
〈x, p | p〉 〈x, p | {p, 4}〉
Fig. 2. The normal case of an execution of CONSENSUS with a correct
primary p. There are n = 5 nodes, of which f = 2 may be faulty, which
requires f +1 = 3 rounds of communication. In the first round, p broadcasts
its initial value, and in the second round, each responder decides on this value
and forwards it to others. No further communication is required in the last
round.
two algorithms separately, with the properties (C1) and (C2)
as the only interface between them.
1) Consensus phase: To show the validity property (C2),
we can assume that the primary p is correct. In this case, all
the primary does is broadcast its value X to all responders and
decide on it. Since channels between correct nodes are reliable
by Assumption (A2), all correct responders will receive X .
Any other values will not be accepted by correct nodes, since
the algorithm discards all values that are not signed by the
primary. Therefore, all correct nodes will decide on X and
validity is satisfied. This also implies the agreement property
(C1) for the case of a correct primary.
We now show that agreement is also guaranteed in the pres-
ence of a faulty primary, which follows from two observations:
(a) When a correct node accepts a new value, all other correct
nodes will have accepted it in the next round. This is implied
by a combination of (A2) with the fact that nodes sign and
share all new values they accept. (b) No new values can be
introduced into the system in the last round. This follows from
the property that in this round, values require f +1 signatures
to be accepted, so any new value must have been signed (and
therefore shared with all other responders) by a correct node
in an earlier round.
2) Logres: Property (C1) ensures that all correct nodes ob-
tain the same set X . Along with the fact that makeLog(L,X)
is a deterministic function, i.e., imposes some known order on
the entries in X , this implies that all correct nodes produce the
same log L′. There are at least n−f ≥ f+1 correct nodes by
assumption (A1), and because (A2) implies reliable channels
between them, each of the correct nodes obtains signatures
for L′ from at least f + 1 nodes (including themselves). This
satisfies the Liveness property.
In order to satisfy the Agreement property, we not only
need to show that all correct nodes produce the same log,
but also that there can exist no other log. This follows from
the assumption that there are at most f faulty nodes, and
since f +1 are required for a valid log, this implies that they
need the signature of at least one correct node to forge a log.
However, since all correct nodes produce the same log, the
faulty processes will not be able to create a different log.
Finally, we give some intuition about Completeness. Let i
be a correct node to which the client sent its request. Then, i
will include the requested entry x in its proposal X , which is
given as input to the CONSENSUS subroutine. Using (C2), we
have that x is contained in the set Xi. When combined with
the agreement properties above, this implies that all correct
nodes will include x in their new log.
3) Denial of Service: A common problem with BFT al-
gorithms is that malicious actors may attempt to introduce a
large number of values into the system in order to decrease
the effective throughput of legitimate requests. Concretely, an
attacker may send an excessive number of requests to a node
such that it is not able to broadcast their value to all receivers
within the duration of a round.
Mitigation against such attacks is specific to the application
deployed on top of the protocol and is thus considered out
of scope, but we envision countermeasures like rate limiting,
client request authentication and duplicate suppression. These
are all common techniques to strengthen resilience of systems
to denial-of-service attacks.
B. Relation to Theoretical Bounds
Pease et al. [28] showed that Byzantine consensus for at
most f faults requires at least f+1 rounds of communication.
An intuition for this bound is as follows. A faulty node may
send different values to different nodes (i.e., perform a split-
world attack, also called equivocation). This is not necessarily
a problem, since correct nodes can communicate with each
other in the next round to try to reach the same state. However,
we want to avoid that faulty nodes keep proposing new values
ad infinitum. Therefore, we must require that messages be
signed by more nodes in further rounds (i.e., at least i nodes
in round i). Even with the above requirement, in any round
i ≤ f , faulty nodes can still make one correct node accept a
new value. That correct node must be able to show the new
value to other correct nodes in the next round, and the only
thing it can do is add its own signature. Therefore, in round
i+1, nodes should accept messages with just i+1 signatures.
As a result, in the worst case, consensus will only be reached
in round f + 1.
Our protocol attains this lower bound because consensus is
reached entirely within the consensus phase, which consists of
f + 1 rounds. The last round (the signing phase) only serves
to collect enough signatures to publish the list that the nodes
have agreed upon.
Moreover, Pease et al. [28] proved that if signatures can be
used, consensus is possible for any n > f . While we assume
that n > 2f , the consensus phase also reaches consensus for
the weaker bound of n > f (which can be shown by modifying
the assumptions in our Isabelle/HOL proof). However, it is
intuitively clear that the secure log replication problem is not
solvable in the case of n ≤ 2f : Consensus can be reached
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among the servers, but clients cannot reliably obtain the correct
result in the presence of adversaries. Since a client cannot
distinguish between faulty and correct nodes, the only way to
ensure that the faulty participants do not forge a result from
the protocol is to require a quorum of nodes to verify it. This
is the purpose of requiring θ = f + 1 signatures for a log
to be valid. Therefore, the system always requires a correct
majority of nodes, and the n > 2f bound holds.
We thus conclude that our protocol is optimal with respect
to both the number of rounds and the number of faulty nodes
tolerated, considering the theoretical bounds on the problem
of secure log replication.
VI. EVALUATION
We have implemented a prototype of Logres in Go con-
sisting of approximately 600 lines of code and used it in a
series of experiments to evaluate the practical performance
of the protocol. The experiments were conducted in a setting
similar to that of Certificate Transparency (CT). In our setup,
a varying number of nodes coordinate to keep an identical
log of certificate entries. The workload is simulated using
randomly generated strings of length equal to the average size
of a CT log entry, which we determined to be approximately
1570 bytes. The period length (duration of a protocol run)
was chosen as one minute. In order to determine if Logres
can support a realistic workload, we compare our results to
the average throughput of one of the largest CT logs to date,
Google Argon 2019 [29].
The nodes were run in a virtual network created using
Mininet on a single machine with two 8-core Intel Xeon
E5-2680 processors running at 2.70GHz and with 32GB of
RAM. In the virtual topology, each node was connected to the
other hosts by a link with capacity 100Mb/s.
A. Scaling
In this experiment, we measure the throughput of the system
as the number of nodes increases, in order to evaluate the
scalability of Logres. The results are displayed in Figure 3.
We observe that performance diminishes as more nodes are
added, which can be explained by the fact that messages need
to be broadcast to other nodes. The uplink capacity limits
the amount of data that can be sent during a round, and
if this capacity must be distributed among more nodes, the
maximum possible throughput decreases. Despite these effects,
we observe that our system is able to support the load of a
real-world CT log with up to 25 nodes.
We used a constant number f = 2 of tolerated faulty
nodes in this experiment. This parameter constitutes a typical
trade-off between performance and security (as discussed in
Section VI-B).
B. Malicious Nodes
The parameter f determines how many faults can be toler-
ated and may be chosen up to a maximum of ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1. How-
ever, larger values of f are also detrimental to performance.
Moreover, even though we have proven the protocol secure for
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Fig. 4. The impact of increasing the parameter f for a fixed n in the case
where all nodes are correct, compared to a simulation of malicious behavior.
these choices of f , adversaries may still be able to deteriorate
the performance of the system by causing communication
overhead. The purpose of this experiment is to measure the
impact of these factors. For this purpose, we use a setup with
n = 10 nodes, where measurements are conducted both with
correct nodes and with a simulation of malicious behavior. The
results are displayed in Figure 4.
1) Correct nodes: In the absence of faulty nodes, the
parameter f has two effects on performance: The consensus
phase consists of f +1 rounds, so the rounds become shorter
as f is increased. This limits the total size of entries that
can be proposed with the same network bandwidth. Secondly,
the clients are also affected by this parameter. In order to
ensure that a request is not dropped by faulty nodes, a client
should replicate it to f + 1 nodes, which amplifies the total
data volume that needs to be exchanged during the protocol
run.
2) Malicious behavior: The simulation of malicious be-
havior is based on a number of observations. The first is
that in executions of CONSENSUS with a correct primary, an
adversary cannot cause the correct nodes to deviate from their
regular behavior. This is because any value that is not signed
by the primary is rejected immediately. Moreover, a malicious
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TABLE I
TIME REQUIRED FOR A REQUEST TO BE PROCESSED, DEPENDING ON THE
NUMBER OF TOLERATED FAULTS f , WITH n = 5 NODES.
f Lower Bound Measured Latency
0 40.34ms 44ms
1 60.51ms 66ms
2 80.68ms 88ms
primary can be blocked immediately by the responders once
equivocation is detected, since the signatures created can be
used to hold the primary accountable. Finally, we have dis-
cussed in Section V-A3 how denial-of-service attacks should
be mitigated by the application running on top of Logres.
From these observations and the properties proved for the
protocol, we can rule out many behavior patterns that allow
the correct nodes to block the adversaries. The attack strategy
we implemented works as follows: The faulty nodes generate
some values, share them among each other and sign them.
These values are then sent to the correct nodes in a later
round. Since the messages carry more signatures than usual,
this causes some communication overhead at the correct nodes.
In our implementation, signatures are 512 bytes long and
thus small in comparison to the large volume of values that are
exchanged. Therefore, we do not expect this attack to have a
great impact. Our hypothesis is confirmed in Figure 4, which
shows no significant difference in average system throughput
between the normal case and the attack scenario. We therefore
conclude that Logres performs well even in the presence of
malicious participants that actively try to sabotage the protocol
execution.
C. Latency
Finally, we investigate the minimum latency attainable by
the protocol. For the previous experiments, the system was
configured with a period length of one minute, but a shorter
interval can be chosen for applications that are subject to
stricter latency requirements.
We will determine the minimum time that is required for
a request to be processed, i.e., from the moment the request
is received by a server until it is added to a new version of
the log. A lower bound on the round length can be computed
using the network parameters between nodes and the size of
requests. In this experiment, we choose links with a latency
of 20ms and a bandwidth 100Mb/s. Again, we use 1570B
values, which results in a minimum bound on round length of
approximately 20.17ms (the time required for transmission of
a single value).
To measure the actual latency of the system, the clients
submit a single request for each period, and we decrease the
round length successively until the minimum value (for which
the requested value is still processed reliably) is reached. We
expect the measurements to exhibit slightly larger values than
the theoretical lower bound due to the computational overhead
due to message processing and signature verification.
The results from the experiment are displayed in Table I for
5 nodes and different values of f . The results show that our
implementation is able to achieve small latencies, close to the
theoretical lower bound.
VII. VERIFICATION
Our verification is based on the Heard-Of model, which was
introduced by Charron-Bost and Schiper [22]. We first provide
a brief overview of this model and how we extended it to
account for signatures. Finally, this section contains a brief
overview of our results and experiences with constructing the
proof. We refer to the appendix for more details about the pro-
tocol formalization (Appendix A) and the proof methodology
(Appendix B) we used in the process.
A. The Heard-Of Model
The Heard-Of model provides a framework for modeling
consensus algorithms in a lock-step model of the system,
where communication is divided into rounds. As the original
model only accounted for benign faults, Biely et al. [12]
extended it to capture malicious behavior. Our proofs are based
on an implementation of this model in Isabelle/HOL by Debrat
and Merz [11].
In this context, we will refer to nodes more generally as
processes. The set of n processes is represented by Π, and M
denotes the set of possible messages. We define M⊥ :=M ∪
{⊥}, where⊥ stands for the absence of a message. Each i ∈ Π
is associated with a process specification Pi = (Si,S
0
i , Si, Ti)
consisting of the following components:
• Si: the set of i’s states, and S
0
i : the set of possible initial
states of process i.
• Si : N × Si × Π → M : the message sending function,
where Si(r, s, j) denotes the message sent by i to j in
round r, given that i is in state s.
• Ti : N × Si ×M
Π
⊥
× Si → {true, false}: the next-state
predicate, where Ti(r, s, µ, s
′) evaluates to true if and
only if s′ is a state that i can reach from state s in round
r, given the vector µ of messages that were received by
i in round r.
The collection of process specifications Pi is called an algo-
rithm on Π.
A run of such an algorithm is defined, for each process i,
by a sequence of states s0i , s
1
i , . . . that satisfies the following
conditions:
• s0i is a valid initial state: s
0
i ∈ S
0
i
• For each r ∈ N, it holds that the next-state predicate
Ti(r, s
r
i , µ
r
i , s
r+1
i ) is true for a message vector µ
r
i col-
lected from the messages sent by the other processes.
We now define µri , which not only depends on the specification
of the algorithm, but also on the communication assumptions.
For each process i and each round r, we define two subsets
of Π:
• HOri : the heard-of set, which places the following con-
straint on the message vector:
j ∈ HOri ⇐⇒ µ
r
i [j] 6= ⊥
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This condition states that some message arrives at i from
each process in HOri , which may or may not conform to
the process specification.
• SHOri : the safe heard-of set, the set of processes whose
message arrives unchanged:
j ∈ SHOri ⇐⇒ µ
r
i [j] = Sj(r, s
r
j , i)
The message received by i is therefore guaranteed to be
the one given by the protocol specification for j.
B. Extension to Signatures
The standard Byzantine fault model can be encoded by
defining a subset F ⊆ Π of Byzantine faulty nodes with |F | ≤
f and choosing the heard-of sets as SHOri = Π \F ⊆ HO
r
i .
This corresponds to the assumption that the messages of
correct nodes arrive according to process specification, and
that faulty nodes may send any message in M or none at all.
However, this property is generally too weak for a protocol
that relies on digital signatures. This cryptographic primitive
is commonly used under the assumption that signatures are
unforgeable, which implies that faulty nodes must not be
allowed to simply send arbitrary elements from the set M .
Instead, we introduce a restriction on messages sent by
faulty nodes that encodes the unforgeable nature of signatures.
While this could also be achieved by modeling Dolev-Yao
intruder knowledge, we chose a simpler approach that requires
fewer modifications to the original model. Let Sig denote the
set of signatures and for each process i, let σi : Π 7→ 2
Sig be a
function that given a message m, extracts the set of signatures
contained in m that are signed by i. Furthermore, Σri is the
set of all signatures sent by i in round r:
Σri :=
⋃
j∈Π
σi(Si(r, s
r
i , j))
From this, we define Mr as the set of all messages that can
be constructed from signatures sent out until round r:
Mr := {m ∈M : ∀i ∈ Cr. σi(m) ⊆
r⋃
r′=0
Σri }
where Cr denotes the set of processes that have not failed yet,
i.e., processes that have been contained in all secure heard-of
sets up to this round. Intuitively, this definition means that an
agent that has stored all messages up to round r can use its
knowledge to construct any message in Mr (e.g., including
signatures received from correct nodes). Note that malicious
nodes are not in the set Cr , and therefore signatures from
them may appear in any messages. This allows for collusion
between attackers, which may share their private keys over
out-of-band channels.
Using these definitions, we can finally define the restriction
on message vectors µri for all rounds r and processes i and j:
µri [j] ∈Mr ∪ {⊥}
In summary, our extension of the HO model encodes the
standard assumption that signatures are unforgeable, while still
allowing faulty processes to sign arbitrary values and colluding
with each other.
C. Verification Results
Our Isabelle/HOL verification of all security properties
claimed in this paper is available online [21]. It consists of
approximately 300 lines of code for the protocol model and
1000 lines of code for the proofs.
The verification process revealed two flaws in previous
versions of the protocol. The first was based on missing
isolation between instances of the CONSENSUS subroutine,
which are invoked in parallel by Logres. Since signatures were
not bound to a specific subroutine, a sophisticated attacker
could have been able to replay legitimate signatures obtained
from one thread in another thread, thereby preventing nodes
from creating a valid log. This vulnerability was fixed by
binding all signatures from a CONSENSUS routine to the
corresponding primary.
In the second attack, an adversary could cause some nodes
to exit from the consensus phase prematurely and thus again
prevent the creation of a valid log.
These insights from our proofs provide further anecdotal
evidence towards the conclusion that proofs must be machine-
checked to provide strong guarantees. The vulnerabilities
described above were not discovered during pen-and-paper
construction of the proof, but only during the process of
mechanizing it. This was detected when the proof assistant
rejected some proof steps that were believed to be correct
after informal reasoning.
The lessons learnt in this process and the practices we are
recommending in Appendix B have also been identified in
other verification projects [8, 30]. Since the advent of large-
scale mechanized proofs, significant progress has been made
in the direction of systematic proof engineering.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Numerous protocols have been designed to solve Byzantine
agreement or BFT state-machine replication [1, 2, 3, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35], and the Abstract framework proposed by Guer-
raoui et al. [4] represents a notable step towards making the
development of these protocols more modular and systematic.
The problem of Byzantine agreement has been known since
1980, when it was first introduced by Pease et al. [28] as the
“Byzantine Generals Problem”. Dolev et al. [36] worked on
signature-based protocols to solve this problem and introduced
the principle of requiring values to have more signatures in
later rounds, which was also used by Biely et al. [12].
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no full machine-
checked proof of a state-of-the-art BFT protocol. The most
notable steps in this direction have been proofs of safety
properties for PBFT by Lamport [37] and more recently Rahli
et al. [38]. Lamport used the TLA+ language in conjunction
with the TLAPS proof system, while Rahli et al. developed
an extension of EventML in the theorem prover Coq to verify
the protocol. The main issue with both of these proofs is that
they omit any liveness properties, which are commonly more
challenging to prove than safety properties. We stress that
these properties are just as important to the security of the
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protocol, especially when deployed in a environment that de-
mands a reliable system. Another approach to verifying PBFT
is based on Event-B and Rodin, but makes the assumption
that messages cannot be forged [39]. A proof in this model
can therefore not provide any guarantees in the Byzantine fault
model.
More success has been achieved for consensus algorithms
that tolerate benign (i.e., non-Byzantine) faults. In a break-
through effort, the IronFleet project [10] fully verified a Paxos-
based distributed system and its implementation using the
Dafny verifier. The Raft [40] protocol is designed to achieve
similar goals as the classic Paxos algorithm, but with the
main design goal of understandability. Many properties of the
system and its implementation have been formally verified in
the Verdi framework for the Coq proof assistant, but liveness
properties were not proved [8].
In the only instance of a complete proof for a BFT protocol
that we are aware of, Debrat and Merz [11] verified two simple
Byzantine consensus protocols in the Heard-Of model using
the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. Our work builds on these
results, showing that similar methods can be applied to a more
practical protocol that makes use of digital signatures.
Model checking is another method of verifying properties
of protocols that can be used as an alternative to formal
proofs. A model checker explores the state space of a system
specification, which can be very useful for exposing design
flaws without requiring a high amount of manual effort.
However, this technique is ineffective at providing assurance of
security for a system due to the constraints that combinatorial
exploration places on the complexity of the model. Zielin´ski
[41] applied model checking to Byzantine consensus protocols,
but due to the tremendous size of the state space caused by
Byzantine faults, the scope of the verification was limited to
only a single round of communication.
In order to address problems related to logging schemes
such as Certificate Transparency, Syta et al. [20] proposed
to leverage multisignatures and distribute trust among many
collective authorities or “cothorities”. However, the rather
complex protocols used by cothorities are proposed without
any formal verification.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presents Logres, a secure log replication proto-
col. To the best of our knowledge, Logres is the first practical
BFT protocol to be accompanied by a complete machine-
checked security proof. This makes the protocol particularly
suitable for security-critical applications that demand high
resilience and reliability.
We have demonstrated that our protocol can achieve suf-
ficient throughput for practical applications such as certifi-
cate logging, even in the presence of actively malicious
participants. Concretely, Logres is able to support the load
of the Certificate Transparency system for up to 25 nodes.
Our system could be further improved by using a hash-tree
based data store such as Trillian [42]. A threshold signature
scheme [43] would also reduce the size of the signed logs
produced by the protocol.
Our extension of the Heard-Of model to signatures can
be used in formal verification of other consensus protocols
that rely on this cryptographic primitive. Future work could
capture other primitives such as message authentication codes
and hash functions. Other interesting paths for future work
include producing a verified implementation of Logres and
considering application-specific optimizations.
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APPENDIX
A. Protocol Formalization
In the following, we show how Logres can be specified
within the extension of the Heard-Of model presented in
Section VII-B and provide formal specifications of the security
properties stated in Section III.
There are two types of messages that are exchanged between
nodes in Logres:
1) The first and most common one is used during the
consensus phase and contains a list of value sets. Let
X denote the domain of entries, and let V be the set
of signatures over sets of values from X , which can be
modeled formally using the definition V := Π×(Π×2X )
(consisting of the author, the identifier of the primary and
the value to be signed). We call these signatures votes.
The set of possible messages of this type is then given
by M1 := Π × 2
V , i.e., it carries a (possibly empty) set
of votes for each primary node.
2) During the signing phase, each node sends out a single
signature over a log. We refer to the domain of logs over
entries from X as LX and model the signatures over logs
as M2 := Π× LX .
These two message domains are combined in the set M :=
M1 ∪M2.
Next, we specify the node states. Since every thread of the
CONSENSUS subroutine requires its own state, we first define
the possible thread states as T := 2X × 2(2
X ) × 2V . This
corresponds to the definitions in Algorithm 2, which consist
of (a) the current decision d ∈ 2X , (b) the sets of values
P ∈ 2(2
X ) witnessed from the primary, and (c) the votes
M ′ ∈ 2V from the current round. A node state stores such
a thread state for each primary in Π, as well as the set of
entries collected from clients, the current version of the log
and some signatures (from the set Σ) for it:
Si := L threads ∈ Π× T ,
entries ∈ 2X ,
log ∈ LX ,
sigs ∈ 2M2 M for i ∈ Π
To simplify the notation, this is specified as a set of records,
which are tuples whose components are named. We use the
syntax s.f to access the field with name f of a state s.
The initial states are defined as follows:
S0i := L threads = Π× {(∅,∅,∅)}),
entries = 2X ,
log = {L},
sigs = ∅ M for i ∈ Π
where L is some initial log that is the same for all nodes.
For the sake of brevity, we omit definitions such as the mes-
sage sending functions and state transition predicates. These
are contained in the Isabelle theories, which are available
online [21] and were used in constructing the proofs.
Using the above definitions, it is now possible to formalize
the security properties of the protocol (defined in Section III):
Agreement All valid logs created during a run of the protocol
must be equal.
∀i, j ∈ Π \ F. sf+2i .log = s
f+2
j .log
Since the protocol consists of f + 2 rounds, sf+2i is the
final state of the protocol run for a node i.
Completeness If an entry is submitted by a client to a correct
node, the node will include it in its next log produced.
∀i ∈ Π \ F. s1i .entries ⊆ s
f+2
i .log
Clients and their requests are not modeled explicitly.
Instead, each node uses the entries field to store all
received requests. We can therefore express the property
as follows: all requested entries that a node has received
before the end of the collection phase (i.e., s1i .entries)
will be included in the log at the end of the protocol run.
Liveness A run of the protocol must always produce a new
valid log for every correct node.
∀i ∈ Π \ F. |sf+2i .sigs | ≥ f + 1
A log is considered valid if it is signed by at least f +1
distinct nodes.
B. Proofs in Isabelle/HOL
1) Using a Proof Assistant: Proof assistants enable the
construction of complex models and machine-checked proofs.
Their greatest advantage over other verifications tools is gen-
erality: they can be applied to practically any system. This is
done by constructing proofs that are analogous to handwritten
proofs, but provide much higher assurance since the proof
assistant verifies its correctness, checking that each step of
the proof is sound. Isabelle/HOL is a particular instance of
this type of program, and its effectiveness has been proven
in large-scale verification efforts such as that of the seL4
microkernel [30].
In order to provide some intuition about how proofs are
constructed with the assistance of Isabelle/HOL, we show the
code that is used to prove a simple statement about set theory,
which is also used during our verification of Logres. It states
that for any two sets A and B that are subsets of a finite
domain C, if the sum of their cardinalities is greater than that
of the domain, then A and B must overlap.
Isabelle can encode statements in higher-order logic (HOL),
using the functional programming language ML, which is en-
riched by a large variety of standard mathematical definitions.
In Isabelle’s meta-language, the lemma stated above can be
formalized as follows:
lemma overlap:
assumes finC: finite C
and subset: A ⊆ C ∧ B ⊆ C
and cardAB: card A + card B > card C
shows A ∩ B 6= {}
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The keywords assumes, and, shows are part of Isabelle’s
meta-language. They identify the premises and conclusions
of the lemma, which can be named as in this example to
improve readability of the code. Isabelle supports reasoning
using declarative proofs in its proof language Isar, which
closely resembles the structure of handwritten proofs. More-
over, Isabelle provides a rich library of common lemmas that
can be used in proofs.
For this lemma, we can use a proof by contradiction. First,
we assume that A ∩B = {}, from which we can deduce two
contradicting results:
• |A ∪ B| > |C|. Given that A and B do not intersect,
|A|+ |B| = |A∪B| holds. This follows from the built-in
rule card -Un-disjoint , which is not defined here for the
sake of brevity.
• |A ∪ B| ≤ |C|. This follows from the fact that since A
and B are both subsets of C, it holds that A ∪ B ⊆ C.
The built-in rule card -mono is used to convert this into
the equation about cardinalities.
From these two statements, we can show False , which is a
contradiction. The code for the complete proof in Isabelle is
shown below:
proof
assume nonempty: A ∩ B = {}
from finC subset have finite A ∧ finite B
using finite-subset by auto
with nonempty cardAB have card (A ∪ B) > card C
by (simp add: card-Un-disjoint)
moreover have card (A ∪ B) ≤ card C
using subset finC by (simp add: card-mono)
ultimately show False by simp
qed
The detailed syntax and semantics of the proof are out of
scope for this brief overview of Isabelle, but thanks to the
structure that resembles the language of handwritten proofs,
the steps are fairly comprehensible. For each step of the proof,
an automated proof strategy (such as auto, simp, . . . ) is given
using a by keyword, providing a hint to the proof assistant
about how the step can be automatically verified. Once the
machine is able to verify all individual steps, the lemma has
been proved.
This particular lemma was chosen as an example due to its
simplicity, but is also a part of our proofs, where we use it
to show that a set of f + 1 nodes always contains at least
one correct node. Our Isabelle theory contains a total of 104
lemmas, most of which are more complex to express and prove
than the one shown above. However, this example serves as
an overview of what to look for when performing high-level
inspection of the proofs.
2) Proof Methodology: In the following, we provide a high-
level description of the process of constructing our proofs
for Logres. Initially, we formalized the protocol specification
(given by pseudocode) in the HO model and specified the
desired properties formally. We have found it an effective
strategy for the construction of a sophisticated proof to proceed
along the following basic steps:
1) Write down a sequence of informal arguments for why the
properties hold (similar to our analysis in Section V-A).
The goal of this step is to identify key intermediate
lemmas around which the proof will be constructed.
2) Formalize the intermediate lemmas from the previous step
to obtain a rough outline in the proof assistant. Insert
placeholders where the proof is incomplete (e.g., using
the sorry keyword in Isabelle) to enable the assistant to
check this outline.
3) Attempt to complete the unfinished proof steps, using
existing lemmas and creating new ones where required.
Repeat this step until all statements are proved.
This strategy is similar to a backward search technique, where
the goal is inspected first and lemmas are created whenever
they are needed to solve open goals.
Naturally, this description of the process is fairly idealized,
as it is often necessary in practice to modify the original
outline or even the protocol itself upon discovering that certain
steps of the proof cannot be completed as expected. This is a
common occurrence, as it is extremely difficult for a human
to anticipate the precise outline of a proof before carrying out
the steps in detail.
It is therefore necessary to ensure that the proofs are robust
to changes and highly automated, such that a small change
in some part of the proof does not require rewriting all of
the remaining steps. For this purpose, we employ the design
concept of modularization, which is standard folklore in the
software engineering domain thanks to its benefits in creating
maintainable code. In the case of a formal proof, this concept
implies that the interfaces at which certain components of the
model interact must be specified clearly and kept as abstract
as possible. Isabelle provides useful concepts for this, called
locales and definitions, which fulfill a similar role as abstract
interfaces in software engineering. Well-designed modular
proofs enable changing details of the protocol or lemmas
without completely rewriting the proof.
An example of how our proof utilizes this concept is
the CONSENSUS subroutine, which is invoked in parallel
by Logres. It is natural to first prove the properties of the
subroutine, providing an interface from which a proof for the
properties for Logres to be constructed. While this composition
appears to be simple, we discovered a possible attack where it
was possible for an adversary to replay legitimate signatures
across different threads, preventing the correct nodes from
creating valid logs.
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